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I. INTRODUCTION 
The function of this study is to render a legal 
determination as to whether or not the data developed by the 
University of Nebraska's Center for Urban Affairs is sufficient to 
state a claim under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 
U.S.C. §§3601 et ~·· commonly known as the Fair Housing Act. 1 
1The desire of the State of Nebraska' a Equal Opportunity 
Commission is, according to the contract it has entered into, "to 
determine whether or not and/or to what extent Redlining is being 
practiced." This judgment is to be based in part upon the 
responsibility of the contractor "[t]o analyze and submit a 
written report" essentially based upon the data provided to the 
contractor by the Center for Applied Urban Research (CAUR) of the 
University of Nebraska. Nhile the essential analysis is provided 
in the context of Title VIII, i·t warrants mention that the 
Nebraska's fair housing act has been considered substantially 
equivalent by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit. Warren v. Norman Realty Company, 513 F. 2d 730 (8th Cir. 
1975). Nebraska Revised Statutes §§20-105-20-125 provide in 
relevant part: 
Sec. 20-105. Civil rights; 
policy of state. It is the policy 
of the State of Nebraska that 
there shall be no discrimination 
in the acquisition, ownership, 
possession, or enjoyment of 
housing throughout the State of 
Nebraska in accordance with 
Article I, section 25, of the 
Constitution of the St.ate of 
Nebraska. 
* * * * 
Sec. 20-107. Unlawful acts 
enumerated. Except as exempted by 
section 20-110, it shall be 
unlawful to: 
(1) Refuse to sell or rent after 
the making of a bono fide offer, 
or to refuse to negotiate for the 
sale or rental of, or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, or to 
refuse to show, or to refuse to 
receive and transmit an offer for, 
a dwelling to any person because 
(footnote continued) 
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Specifically, based btpon information provided to 
the Commission by the· Center for Applied Urban Research, a 
research institute of the University of Nebraska (CAUR), the 
commission seeks to determine if the existing data is sufficient 
of race, color, religion, or 
national origin; 
(2) Discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions or 
priveleges of sale or rental of a 
dwelling, or in the provision of 
services or facilities in 
connection therewith, because of 
race, color, religion, or national 
origin; 
(3) Make, print, or publish, or 
cause to be made, printed or 
published any notice, statement, 
or advertisement, with respect to 
the sale or rental of a dwelling 
that indicates any preference, 
limitation, or discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, or 
national origin, or an intention 
to make any such preference, 
limitation, or discrimination; 
( 4) Represent to any person 
because of race, color, religion, 
or national origin that any 
dwelling is not available for 
inspection, sale, or rental when 
such dwelling is in fact so 
available; 
(5) Cause to be made any written 
or oral inquiry or record 
concerning the race, color, 
religion, or national origin of a 
person seeking to purchase, rent, 
or lease any housing; 
(6) Include in any transfer, 
sale, rental, or lease of housing 
any restrictive covenants, or to 
honor or exercise or attempt to 
honor or exercise any restrictive 
covenant pertaining to housing; 
( 7) Discharge or demote an 
employee or agent or discriminate 
in the compensation of such 
employee or agent because of such 
employee's or agent's obedience to 
(footnote continued) 
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to establish a violation of the provisions of the Fair Housing Act 
which outlaw racially discriminatory lending or insurance 
practices generally falling under the umbrella of "redlining." 2 
the provisions of section 20-105 
to 20-125, 48-1102, and 48-1116; 
(8) Induce or attempt to induce, 
for profit, any person to sell or 
rent any dwelling by 
representations regarding the 
entry or prospective entry into 
the neighborhood of a person or 
persons of a particular race, 
color, religion, or national 
origin. 
Sec. 20-108. Denial of loan 
because of race, color, religion, 
or national origin; unlawful. It 
shall be unlawful to any bank, 
building and loan association, 
insurance company or other 
corporation, association, firm or 
enterprise whose business consists 
in whole or in part in the making 
of commercial real estate loans, 
to deny a loan or other financial 
assistance to a person applying 
therefor for the purpose of 
purchasing, constructing, 
improving, repairing, or 
maintaining a dwelling, or to 
discriminate against the applicant 
in the fixing of the amount, 
interest rate, duration, or other 
terms or conditions of such loan 
or other financial assistance, 
because of race, color, religion, 
national origin or sex or such 
person or of any person associated 
with the applicant in connection 
with such loan or other financial 
assistance or of the purposes of 
such loan or other financial 
assistance, or of the present or 
prospective owners, lessees, 
tenants ·Or occupants of the 
dwelling or dwellings in relation 
to which such loan or other 
financial assistance is to be made 
or given; provided, that nothing 
(footnote continued) 
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In November, 1982, CAUR submitted to the commission 
a paper suggesting procedures which could be employed to 
investigate mortgage lending and residential insurance practices 
in Omaha in determining >~hether or not and/or to what extent 
redlining is being practiced. A primary thrust (outside the scope 
contained in this section shall 
impair the scope or effectiveness 
of the exceptions contained in 
section 20-110. 
2cAUR and others have generally investigated the following types 
of subtle discrimination generally relied upon in support of the 
proposition that redlining is being practiced. 
(1} Required down payments of a higher 
amount than are usually required for 
financing comparable properties in other 
areas. 
(2} Fixing loan interest rates in 
amounts higher than those set for all or 
most other mortgages in other areas. 
(3} Fixing loan closing costs in amounts 
higher than those set for all or most 
other mortgages in-other areas. 
(4} Fixing loan maturities 
number of years to mature set 
most other mortgages in other 
below the 
for all or 
areas. 
(5} Refusing to lend on properties above 
a prescribed maximum number of years of 
age. 
( 6} Refusing to make loans in dollar 
amounts below a certain minimum figure, 
thus excluding many of the lower-priced 
properties often found in neighborhoods 
where redlining is practiced. 
( 7} Refusing to lend on the basis of 
presumed "economic obsolescence" no 
matter what the condition of an olde 
property may be. 
(8} Stalling on appraisals to discourage 
(footnote continued) 
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of the analysis provided herein) was an analysis of home mortgage 
date derived from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 3 data, as 
well as Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) data. While such a 
thrust was clearly merited, such data by and large would not test 
mortgage lending nor insurance practices. Yet, such data from a 
statistical analysis of overall practices would be important (see 
Section II(c) of this report dealing with the role of statistics 
in determining violations of Title VIII). 
With regard to insurance practices, the 1982 CAUR 
proposal contemplated resolving the question of whether or- not 
barriers exist to the availability of property insurance in 
different Omaha community areas. Conceding that the development 
of relevant data would be "difficult," CAUR identified various 
methods employed in redlining. 4 
potential borrowers. 
This analysis, of course, simply focuses not on the studies -
themselves, but rather the legal sufficiency of evidence gathered 
at the present time. 
3
cAUR has compiled an excellent synopsis which identifies much of 
the important writings on this topic. Ruff, "A Review of 
Literature Related to Uses of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, 
Residential Disinvestment, and Homeowner Insurance Cost and 
Access" (Sept. 30, 1983). 
4Among the redlining techniques identified by others were: 
(1) Placing 
to reduce 
business in 
agents selectively in order 
the opportunity to secure 
certaina areas; 
(2) Terminating 'unprofitable' agents 
and nonrenewing terminated agents' books 
of business; 
( 3) Requiring insurance to replacement 
cost value and refusing to insure 
dwellings with a subst·antial disparity 
(footnote continued) 
5 
J 
The project sought to create three reports, the 
first analyzing data sources and the second to be a gathering of 
information based upon insurance industry interviews. The third 
report, key to this analysis, would be to provide an analysis of 
the differences between paired areas of the conununi ty. Factors 
such as percentages of people insured, differences in amount of 
between 
value. 
replacement 
. , 
cost and market 
(4) Refusing, limiting, or varying 
insurance availability solely because of 
age of structure; 
(5) Refusing, limiting, or varying 
insurance availability due to subjective 
evaluation by agents or by inspectors 
that certain areas are 'deteriorating' 
or 'changing' i 
(6) Refusing, limiting, or varying 
insurance availability due to subjective 
perceptions of 'adverse factors' such as 
the race or sex of an applicant or the 
racial composition of the geographic 
area in which the risk is located; 
(7) Requiring inspections in certain 
locations within a state but not within 
other locations; 
(8) Applying territorial classifications 
in certain locations of a state but not 
in others; 
(9) Pricing insurance at such high 
levels that, for all practical purposes, 
it is unavailable; 
(10) Informally instructing or formally 
requiring agents to avoid certain areas; 
(11) Varying underwriting 
solely by ZIP code; 
practices 
( 12) Refusing to accept an application 
bec~ause it was previously rejected by 
another company or because the risk was 
previously insured under a FAIR plan. 
- 6 -
' 
,, 
type of coverge as >vell as premium amounts and customer treatments 
were to be considered. The third report, particularly in the 
context of the first two reports, represented an extraordinarily 
ambitious proposed undertaking. 5 
5The organization of the CAUR effort 
proposal by "phases" as follows: 
was broken down 
Analyze existing insurance 
other relevant data. 
(A) Review state insurance 
records and procedures 
increase applications. 
data and 
department 
e.g., rate 
(B) Analyze state level records to 
determine differences between insurance 
zones (the zones are very large--about 
four for the entire state--but the data 
might suggest differences and the need 
for smaller zones). 
(C) Gather records from "cooperative" 
insurance agents and/or companies. 
(D) Plot location of insurance offices 
and agents. 
(E) Analyze police and fire data to 
determine patterns of losses. 
Select and intereview 50 insurance 
agents, underwriters, and executives. 
(A) Review underwriting standards. 
(B) Evaluate marketing efforts and 
programs. 
(C) Solicit views on insurance problems 
in minority areas. 
(D) Solicit views on policy options to 
reduce risk. 
Interview community leaders and lenders. 
Select 100 test and 100 control 
in its 
(footnote continued) 
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The primary resultant documents utilized in the 
legal analysis were a 72-page document enti t.led "Homeowner 
Insurance Availability and Cost in Omaha, Nebraska" prepared by 
Peggy Coffin with Jack Ruff on September 30, 6 7 1983 and a 64-page 
report entitled "An Analysis of Mortgage Lending Patterns in 
Omaha." 
In order to provide context, however, independent 
investigation was undertaken by the contractor, including 
interviews to individuals concerned with housing discrimination. 
Moreover, the contractor requested and obtained additional data, 
primarily prepared by CAUR, including information relative to 
Omaha residential sales patterns, the growth of housing prices in 
Omaha, and Omaha area demographic change between 1970 to 1980. 
parcels. 
(A) Send letters to households 
(B) Conduct initial screening interview. 
(C) Conduct interviews. 
Use of testers. 
li'ri te report on the nature and uses of 
existing data. 
Write a report on insurance industry 
views. 
Write a report measuring the differences 
between target and control households. 
6
on January 9, 1984, the contractor received an additional report, 
"A Comparison of Real Estate Transfers in Three Omaha Jl.reas" 
prepared by Jack Ruff. Although the samples are small, the 
results, if not legally significant in terms of Title VIII, are 
interesting, but had no effect on the conclusions drawn. 
7Excluding the appendix. 
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II. REDLINING: DEFINITIONS IN LEGAL'-CONTEXT UNDER 'l'I'l'LE VIII 
The word "redlining" does not appear in- the Fair 
Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 
§3601, et seq. However, through some limited interpretations of 
Title VIII, we recognize that racially discriminatory lending or 
insurance practices are covered. This, of course, must be 
distinguished to a certain degree from geographic disparities, 
which may or may not be racial, and which may often be considered 
based on HMDA and CRA data. That type of redlining is not the 
focus of this legal analysis. We simply limit our analysis to the 
data provided within the context of Title VIII. 
Of course, it can be effectively argued that 
redlining systematically discriminates against the urban core and 
its residents because older structures and 11 Undesirable 11 
neighborhoods are disproportionately located there. The refusal 
to write policies may constitute de facto discrimination against 
blacks who represent more than twenty-two percent of the urban 
population nationwide and a much larger percentage in several 
major cities. 
practices have: 
Furthermore, HUD has concluded that industry 
an undeniable [intra-city] racial 
component. Redlined areas often 
coincide with nonwhite neighborhoods ... 
[Redlining] extends far beyond blighted 
urban areas into many otherwise healthy 
neighborhoods . . . . The tentacles of 
these crises [i.e., availability and 
affordability] reach into diverse areas 
of mortgage financing and property 
appraisals thereby denying credit and 
sealing the doom of today's vital urban 
neighborhoods. 
- 9 -
Disinvestment and building abandonment ih redlined 
areas are accelerated by skyrocketing maintenance and operating 
costs. Families with the means to do so flee redlined areas, r 
leaving behind the higher insurance costs and the stigma of the 
• 
residual market. Hard-pressed owners who have foregone property 
insurance coverage lack the financial capacity to rebuild after a 
fire. White flight, which accompanies disinvestment, almost 
invariably leads to accelerated racial and economic segregation. 
Moreover, underwriting preconceptions are 
reinforced by an underwriter's or agent's contact with his or her 
counterparts throughout the industry. The firm functions in an 
industry that rewards conservatism. The consumer is not always 
fre to avoid the discriminating supplier; insurance is necessary 
for mortgage credit. 
When Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act, it was 
well-aware of the problems of urban deterioration and unrest that 
had been caused in part by redlining practices, and of the impact 
of these practices in limiting housing opportunities for the p·oor 
and urban minorities. Congress enacted a broad prohibition in 
l section 804 (b) of the Act, making it unlawful to "refuse to sell 
I or rent after the making of bona fide offer, or refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable 
i 
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race or color. 
The courts have given great sweep to these 
I provisions. In Trafficante v. l'letropolitan Life Insurance Co., 
the Supreme Court stated that the Act is an attempt to replace the 
ghettos with "truly integrate<} and balanced living patters." The 
- 10 -
statute was intended to protect all persons, white as well as 
black/ from the 11 loss of important benefits of racial 
association.'' In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. , the Court 
described the Fair Housing Act as a "detailed housing law, 
applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and 
enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority." 
Courts have held that the Act regulates not only 
the direct sale and rental of housing, but also a wide variety of 
other practices which collectively "make unavailable or deny" 
housing opportunities and thus frustrate the goal of racially 
integrated neighborhoods. 8 These activities include racial 
' 9 steer1.ng, blockbusting, 10 and discriminatory appraisal 
8In Trafficante, the Supreme Court asserted that he Fair Housing 
Act is to be accorded a "generous" construction so that it could 
accomplish the "enormous" task that Congress contemplated for it. 
409 U.S. at 211, 212. See also Park View Heights Corp. v. City of 
Black Jack, 605 F. 2d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 1979). In Otero v. New 
York City Hous. Auth., 484 F. 2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1974), the 
Second Circuit stressed the importance of the Act's goals and held 
that they supersede the otherwise racially neutral tenant 
assignment practices of the City Housing Authority. In Gladstone 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, lll n. 24 (1979), 
the Supreme Court also explicitly noted the relationship between 
housing integration and the achievement of school integration. 
9
united States ''· Mitchell, 580 F. 2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 
F. Supp. 486, 488-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Real Estate 
One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1144, 1152 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Fair 
Hous. Council v. Eastern Bergen County 11ul tiple Listing Se~ 
Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 76 (D.N.J. 1976); Zuch v. Hussey, 
394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047-49 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd 547 F. 2d 1168 
(6th Cir. 19 7 7) . 
10
united St.ates v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F. 2d 115, 119-
22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); Zuch v. Hussey, 
394 F. Supp. 10~1940-50 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd 547 F. 2d 1168 
(6th Cir. 19 77) • 
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l 
practices. 11 
In 1976, two district courts held that the Fair 
Housing Act prohibits the refusal to lend, or the imposition of 
less favorable mortgage loan terms or conditions, because of a 
neighborhood's racial composition. 12 In Laufman v. Oakley 
Building & Loan Co., the court examined at length the factors that 
prompted the Act's passage: the violent 1967 riots and the report 
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. 13 The 
Commission's report detailed the roles of white flight and 
institutional disinvestment in the creation of ghettoes of despair 
and the incitement of disorder. 14 "The practical effect [of 
redlining] is to discourage whites--who may freely move 
elsewhere--from moving into vacancies in 'changing neighborhoods,' 
thereby inducing "massive transition' and ultimately 'white 
flight' • 15 Further, "the cost of housing being what is is today, 
a denial of financial assistance in connection with the sale of a 
house would e·ffecti vely 'make unavailable or. deny a dwelling.' 
When such denial occurs as a result of racial considerations, 
[section 804(b) of the Act, 42 U.SC.§ §3604 is transgressed." 16 
Tlunited States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 
F. Supp. 1072, 1978-79 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
12H . . h arr1son v. He1nzerot , 
Laufman v. Oakley, 408 F. 
13 408 F. Supp. at 496-97. 
414 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ohio 1976); 
Supp 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). 
14NAT'L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 244, 245 (1968) 
quoted in 408 F. Supp. at 496. 
15 408 F. Supp. at 497. 
16' Id. at 493. In Laufman, the court 
stated a cause of action under 
- 12 
also 
42 
found that plaintiffs 
u.s.c. §3605 (1976) 
(footnote continued) 
'. 
" 
The court examined both the legislative history and the plain 
meaning of the statute and found Title VIII violations. 
It was only a short leap from the premise that 
denial of finaneial assistance is a violation of the Act ot the 
assertion that making property insurance unavailable or 
unaffordable on the basis of race or national origin is a 
violation. In Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Co., 17 plaintiffs were 
black homeowners, residing in a predominantly black neighborhood, 
whose coverage was not renewed when their agent's business 
portfolio was terminated. Plaintiffs alleged that their loss of 
homeowners' insurance was directly related to the location of 
their residence in a predominantly black neighborhood, the fact 
that they were black, and to the racial composition of their 
agent's portfolio of homeowners' insurance. The court observed 
that the language "otherwise make unavailable or deny" has been 
construed to be "as broad as Congress could have made it". 18 
Noting the connection drawn in Laufman between financing and the 
availability of suitable housing, the district court continued: 
the availability of appropriate 
insurance is a necessary predicate ·to 
the availability of financing, and 
financial assistance is a precondition 
to securing availability of adequate 
(discrimination in the financing of housing) and §3 617 (unlawful 
interference with the exercise of rights under §§3603-3606). The 
Harrison opinion was not explicit as to precise protection being 
infringed. 
17 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
18 472 F. Supp. 1108, citing United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 
370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 509 F. 
2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) and Zuch v. Hussey, 366F. Supp. 553, 557 
(E.D. Mich. 1973). ----
- 13 -
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I 
housing. '-- [Thus,] a discriminatory 
denial of insurance would prevent a 
person economically able to do so from 
buying a house. Consequently, although 
insurance redlining is not expressly 
proscribed by the Act, it is encompassed 
by both the broad language of §3 604 (a) 
and the legislative design of the Act 
which seeks to eliminate discrimination 
within the hou·sing field. 
The Court also relied heavily on HUD's 
interpretation of insurance redlining as a Title VIII violation. 
Since at least a few federal courts have held that 
certain kinds of either insurance or lending practices may be 
unlawful under Title VIII, it is important before we review the 
Omaha data to understand the governing fair housing legal 
principles as they would apply to the data. Once the impact of 
these principles is understood (i.e., the use of testers, how 
"much" need race be a factor, statistics, etc.), we can more 
thoughtfully draw our conclusions concerning the legal sufficiency 
of the data in a Title VIII context. 
A. Tester Evidence Is A Valid Measuring Tool 
Of Home Insurance 
l\_ny evidence of disparate treatment is probative 
and the courts unanimously accept tester testimony. 19 We may 
r 9Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 u.s. 363 (1982); Gladstone 
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), aff'g in 
part, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978); Washington v. Sherwin Real 
Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cor. 1982); Price v. Pelka, 690 
F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Kinney v. Rothchild, 678 F.2d 658 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Phiffer v. Proud Parrot 1-!otor Hotel, 
Inc., 648 F. 2d 548 (9th Cir. 1980); HcDonald v. Verble, 622 F. 2d 
--- (footnote continued) 
- 14 -
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therefore legally conclude that the experiences of the so-called 
"researchers" in posing as homeseekers during the inquiring of 
available insurance policies would be a valid and proper element 
of evidence in the context of Title VIII. It is clear that the 
researchers, actually testers in a fair housing context, need not 
1227 (6th Cir. 1980): Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 
1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1978); /<!eyers v. 
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assn, 559 F. 2d 894, 897-98 ( 3rd 
Cir. 1977): Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Connell v. Shoemaker, 555 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. Warwick Mobile Home Estates, Inc., 537 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 
1976); Smith v. Anchor Bldg Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 234 n 2 (8th Cir. 
1976); /<!arr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974); Seaton v. Sky 
Realty co:-;- 491----p-:-::;d 634 (7th Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Jerry PaiS 
Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 
F.2d 908 (lOth Cir. 1973); Education-Instruccion, Inc. v. Copley 
Mgmt & Dev. Corp. , Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1115, 4 53 ( D /<lass. 
Oct. 14, 1982); Darden v. Nebilak, Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 
1118,037 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1982); Sherman Park Community Ass'n v. 
Wauwatosa Realty Co., 486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980); United 
States v. Welles-Bowen Co., Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1115,314 
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 1979), aff'd mem, 673 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 
1981), opinion published, Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1115,411 
(6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1981); vlainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293 
(D.M.D. 1978), aff'd mem. 605 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1979): Wheatley 
Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 
486, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Burris v. Wilkins, 2 Equal Opportunity 
Hous (P-H) 115,219 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1977), aff'd, 544 F.2d 891 
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. 
Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (inept techniques used): Dillon v. 
AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 597 
F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Elazer v. Wright, 2 Equal Opportunity 
Hous (P-H) tl5,197 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rented to white person acting 
as agent for rejected minority); Adams v. Hempstead Heath Co., 1 
Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1113,781 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1976); 
Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1975) aff'd 
oercuriam, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977); Lyles v. Hampton, l 
Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1113,738 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 1975): 
Hawkins v. Hogue, l Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1113,711 (S.D. 
Ohio May 14, 1975): Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 
197 5): Collins v. Spasoj cevic .~ Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 
1113,654 (N.D. Ill. ~lay 17, 1974); Guillory v. Bryan, 1 Equal 
Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1113,642 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1974); United 
States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 647 (N.D. Cal. 
1973); aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam); Williamson v. Hampton Mgmt Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Martin v. John C. Bowers & Co., 334 F. Supp. 5 
(N.D. Ill. 1971); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (N.D. 
(footnote continued) 
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actually be required to seek coverage of any sort. It is 
sufficient under the Fair Housing Act that the representation be 
made and that the resp·onding party have some belief that the 
inquirer is seeking the benefit of information. On the assumption 
that this occurred, it may be concluded that the data gathered in 
this fashion may be admissible under the standards enunciated by 
the courts and that this element of the research project is a 
permissible and authentic method of data-gathering. 
Furthermore, it would also be proper to conclude 
that the legal impact of the data gathered may properly be 
measured. 
Findings 
The specific evidence reflects a series of 
telephone surveys of residents within specific blocks at three 
different locations. The "matched block" methodology sought to 
contro·l the survey based on the concept that the exclusive block 
difference was solely racial. The survey sought to answer the 
questions (a) if people "have different insurance policies" based 
on the racial difference of an area and (b) if more or less 
insurance is provided based on the race of an area. 
Tex. 1971); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. 
Harris v. Jone8,'""" 296 F":'""Supp. 1082 
Lake Lorelei, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407 
- 16 -
Supp. 151 
(D. Mass. 
(S.D. Ohio 
(N.D. Ohio 1969); 
19 6 9 ) ; Newbern v. 
1968). 
' 
• 
'i'he three block groups (Number 5 of Census Tract 
61. 02 in North Omaha, Number l of Census Tract 30.00 in South 
Omaha and Number 3 of Census Tract 52.00, the Bemis Park area) 
were the subject of 85 attempted telephone contacts. 
reasons, a net 39 responded. 
For various 
Bemis Park residents had less homownership and 
generally lived in housing of older stock. 
A key finding was a correlation between length of 
insurance to length of ownership, irrespeci:i ve of race. The 
actual numbers reflecting Hease" of obtaining insurance was not 
significantly variant based on 
the property by agents were 
race of the residents. Visits to 
further not significantly diverse 
based on rase. Furthermore, the coverage issue is difficult to 
decipher in terms of Title VIII in that Bemis Park residents 
received information, for example, setting forth liability 
coverage up to nearly $64,000 to $74,000, while some residents in 
North and South Omaha received limitations of amounts to the 
extent that the coverage ranged in the lesser amounts to bet~Jeen 
$39,000 to in excess of $63,000. While the lowest amount 
($11,000) was in the Bemis area and the amount highest was in 
North Omaha ($203,900), it would be difficult to conclude that 
race was the variable. 
The amounts of premium figures are not matched 
against the limits of liability. For example, one Bemis Park 
resident pays $108, while a North Omahan pays $36. No information 
is provided in tis match-up as to value of house, nature of 
coverage, and other factors~ which are not reflected in the 
- 17 -
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controls. Where claims arise, the homeowner's perception'- of 
"fairness" further showed no racial diversity. Perception was 
somewhat important concerning the topic of why a claim was not 
filed. Only in the Bemis Park area was there any showing that the 
belief of the resident that. rates would increase justified not 
filing a claim. No empirical evidence, however, exists in the 
report. Finally, it is clear that all telephoned residents 
received coverage. As the report itself concedes in the first 
part, it is unclear if the homeowner initiated inquiry concerning 
broader coverage. 
B. Factors Other Than Race Tn The Decision-
Making Process In Granting Home Insurance 
or Granting a Loan 
Under Title VIII, courts are faced with a dilemma 
where there are two or more motivations or considerations for the 
alleged discriminatory act. Race can be the sole motivating 
r . h ' d ' t t' 1 20 ' 'f' t 21 b t Lactor or one t at 1s om1nan , par 1a , or s1gn1 1can , u 
it need not be the sole reason for the action, 22 and the presence 
20 Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (lv.D. Mo. 1974). 
21
woods-Drake v. ·Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982); Marable v. 
H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981)'; Burris v. 
Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pelzer 
Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1974). --
22smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); 
t1arable v. H. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); 
Robinson rejects an earlier Second Circuit case, Duckett v. 
Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1978), which suggested 
the race factor had to be the sole motivating factor, as all cases 
decided and found by the court established a violation where 
evidence indicated race as one part of motivation. Race was not 
found to be a partial motivator in Duckett. See also Payne v. 
Bracher, 582 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978); Metropoiitan~sing Dev. 
(footnote continued) 
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I> 
of some valid justification does not make a decision valid where 
it is partially motivated by 23 race. The majority of courts, 
including the federal court of appeals which jurisdiction includes 
Omaha, takes the position that, despite the presence of valid 
jurisdiction for rejecting an applicant, if race is a factor in 
the decision-making process, the action is unlawful. 24 
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977); cert. denied, 434 u.s. 1025 (1978); Burris v. Wilkins, 
544 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th 
Cir. 1970); United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819 
(E.D. Mich. 1982); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969) 
(race found to be--rile sole motivation). The difficulty of 
measuring bias has prompted the Supreme Court to rely on lower 
court findings. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982) 
(maintenance of at-large voting found intentionally racially 
discriminatory by lower federal court); Crawford v. Board of 
Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982) (state court found antibusing 
initiative not racially motivated). 
23
united States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 416 u.s. 936 (1974). 
24
smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982); 
Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1979); Taylor 
v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1979); Miller 
v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Payne v. Bracher, 582 
F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1978); Sorenson v. Ravmond, 532 F.2d 496 (5th 
Cir. 1976); Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); 
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d :i:T4"(4th Cir. 
1974) (per curiam); Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336, 338 
(7th Cir. 1972); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 
463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 
436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. City of Birmingham, 
538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp. 
600 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, Equal 
Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1115,404 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1981); McHaney 
v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Tenn. 1981); Normal v. St. Louis 
Concrete Pipe Co., 447 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Bishop v. 
Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Drain v. Friedman, 422 
F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Hampton v. Roberts, 386 F. Supp. 
609 (W.D. Va. 1974); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 
1975); Lyles v. Hampton, l Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1113,738 
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 1975); Branch v. Deaver, 1 Equal Opportunity 
Hous (P-H) 1113,689 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1974); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 
F. Supp. 1305 (W.O. Mo. 1974); Williamson v. Hampton Mgm:t:' Co., 
(footnote continued) 
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l 
I 
I 
The rule that race may not be a factor applies 
where the rights of many are at stake 25 or where just the rights 
26 
of one person are affected. 
Findings 
The "policy/premium" aspect of the report was the 
most legally significant. The objective was to determine housing 
location and amount of premium quoted. It was clear that housing 
age, based on the response of insurance agents, is an important 
factor, but it could not be established that . race necessarily 
controlled the "age" policy. The report concludes that "[l]ittle 
variation was noted in the premium price among three 
locations " ~loreover, for older housing, so-called "standard" 
policies were offered. While the findings show a clear disparity 
in the type of coverage and the cost of coverage, the disparity, 
again, appears to relate to age, not clearly race. 
What ~oms significant was the difference in quality 
of coverage. A house in North Omaha, for example, was not offered 
the same coverage as the same housing in West Omaha. It is clear 
that there is a need for additional data. 
339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United States v. Reddoch, l 
Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) ~13,569 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 1972), 
aff'd per curiam, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Bush v. Kaim, 297 
F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969) ("motivating reason~ --
25village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 
429 u.s. 1 (1977); Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., v. Village of 
Arlington Heights, 588 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of BlackJack, 508 
F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
26Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979); Smith 
v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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C. Statistics On Housing Discrimination 
Generally In Omaha And Their Impact 
On The Insurance Study 
Although statistical evidence is relevant to a 
claim of discrimination, the federal court of appeals affecting 
Omaha and other federal appeals courts have held that it is not 
necessarily decisive. 27 Courts do take judicial notice of 
patterns of segregation, 28 and evidence that a practice will 
t t . t" t" 29 perpe ua e ex~s ~ng segrega ~on or actions which can injure an 
integrated community 30 will often satisfy the prima facie case 
requirement. For example, the total absence of minorities from a 
large area is often powerful evidence. 31 A prima facie case can 
27 Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F. 2d 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 
denied, 419 u.s. 1021 (1974). 
231 (8th Cir. 1976); 
792, 805 n. 19 (1973); 
82 7 (8th Cir. ) , cert. 
28
c1ark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, lt19 U;S. 1070 (1974); §§3.42 (discrim"ination in 
terms of sale or lease), 7.01 (dual housing markets). 
29Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); 
United States v. City of Birminghaffi, 538 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 
1982); McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Tenn. 1981). 
30Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
31Here, the role of statistics become particularly significant. 
To cite an example, from a population 20% black, a ratio of 
disproportion of 2:1 would mean that 4 0% of the disadvantaged 
class was black. A ratio of 1:1 would mean that 20% of the 
disadvantaged class was black, which would equal their percentage 
of the total population and would indicate the action involved had 
no disproportionate impact on blacks. The ratio is similar to 
population-work force disparities in employment discrimination. 
See B. Schlei & P Grossman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 36 
(2d ed Supp. 1979). Using this method in a community with a 20% 
black population, an apartment complex or subdivision with 5 
blacks out of 100 would have a ratio of 4:1. Only one black in 
(footnote continued) 
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often be based on a delay or avoidance_. 32 
Statistical evidence of disparate effect of a 
practice on a protected minority is highly probative. 33 
Findings 
that project would carry a 20:1 ratio. E.g., Smith v. Town of 
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055· (4th Cir. 1982) (blocking public housing 
fell more harshly on blacks by a ration of 2. 65:1); Jordan v. 
Dellway Villa of Tennessee, Ltd., 661 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1981), 
cert: denied, 455 u.s. 1008 (1982) (of 1622 applications for new 
subsidized housing, 70.9% were black, yet rented to only 18% 
blacks for a ratio of 3. 9:1) . For an analysis of how to identify 
the relevant housing market, see Bogan & Falcon, supra. See also 
D. Baldus & J. Cole, supra. Such a ratio is a starting place and 
provides excellent evidence to aid in establishing a prima facie 
case. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 
(1975) (ratio of 8.:1 in employment challenge to standardized 
tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 u.s. 424, 429, 430 n. 6 
( 1971) (ratio of 2. 8:1 from high school diploma requirement; 8:1 
sufficient as to barriers from standardized test); United States 
v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 428, 439 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 434 u.s. 875 (1977) (3.4:1 sufficient with respect to 
employment discrimination under the revenue sharing 
nondiscrimination provisions); Green v. Missouri Pac. RR, 523 F.2d 
1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1975) (2.3:1 sufficient in employment case 
based on refusal to hire any with criminal record); Garrett v. 
City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'g on other 
grounds, 335 F .. Supp. 16, 20 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (5:1 sufficient 
with respect to Title VI challenge to urban renewal displacement); 
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 729 (lst Cir. 1972) (2.6:1 
sufficient); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1171-73 
(2d Cir. 1972) (1.5:1 sufficient); Larry v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 
926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (2.25:1 sufficient in Title VI chal-lenge to 
segregated classes resulting from IQ test placement policy); 
Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) 
( 3. 6:1 sufficient in challenge to municipal services allocation 
under revenue sharing program); Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 
1198 (5th Cir. 1982) (never had black tenant); Marable v. H. 
Walker & Assoc., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (no blacks ever 
accepted); Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 623 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 
1980) (only rejections by club were of blacks); United States v. 
Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972) (96 apartments and 100% 
turnover per year in three years yet never a black tenant); United 
States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974) 
(no black ever resided in development); United States v. Raymond, 
1 Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 113,618 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 1973) 
(all white); United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 
1972) (never rented to blacks before admitted); United States v. 
(footnote continued) 
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l 
No statistical disparity is evident based on the 
data provided. Another dimension of the study, for example, 
inquiries of insurance companies. Seven (7) callers made sixty-
two (62) contacts with companies. The so-called "shopper's 
survey" actually was based. upon 55 completed questionnaires.. The 
Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972) 
(satisfied prima facie test); Cf. United States v. Hinds County 
Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.), ("nothing is more 
emphatic than zero"), supplemented, 423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970). 
32
stevens v. Dabs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); 
United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (:•J.D. Fla. 1972); 
Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d 
Cir. 1981); Marable v. H. Walker Assocs., 644 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 
1981); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 
1970); Elazer v. Wright, Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) 1115,197 
(S.D. Ohio 1976); Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 
1969); Gore v. Turner, 563 F. 2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Wharton v. 
Knefel, 562F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); Dillon v. Bay City Constr. 
co., 512 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. West Peachtree 
Tenth Corp., 437 F. 2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); Dennis v. Bethune, 1 
Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) t 13, 719 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 1975); 
United States v. Reddoch, 1 Equal Opportunity Hous (P-H) ll 13,569 
(S.D. Ala. Jan 27, 1972), aff'd per curiam, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1972); Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969). 
33Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) ("figures 
speak and when they do courts listen") (municipal equalization of 
services) citing Brooks v. Beta, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 386 U.S. 975 (l967~Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 
583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962), aff'd, 371 u.s. 37 (1962). See 
generally Harper v. Hutton, 594 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1979) (50 
units and one black tenant ·in 10 years); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. 
Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Clark v. Universal Builders, 
Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 1070 (1974); 
WEathers v. Peters Realty Corp.~99 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 
1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (employment); Young v. Parkiaild 
Village, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1978) (opened in 1940's, 
first black tenant 1975, at trial, 7 of 59 units); United States 
v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd 
as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (20% of 
1133 units rented to blacks and of 11 buildings, 6 never had 
blacks, a statistic sufficient to satisfy the prima facie case 
requirement) . See generally D. Baldus & J. Cole, STATISTICAL 
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 1980); Bogan & 
Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 Md. 
L. Rev. 59(1974): - --
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callers all had similar housing. Four callers living in ''good to 
excellent" housing, and three in "poor" condition housing. An 
"insurability" formula was devised based on the questions and , 
responses and the diversity (one caller lived in an area which was 
.. 
85% black and another caller lived in an area in excess 99% white) 
sought to control factors with the exception of race. The report 
accurately concludes that location of housing reflects no question 
of insurance disparity based upon race. 
II. METHODOLOGY IN LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FACTS 
The essential pieces of information utilized in the 
study were the Center's September, 1983 studies entitled 
"Homeownership Insurance Availability and Cost in Omaha, Nebraska" ' 
and "An Analysis of Hortgage Lending Patterns in Omaha." 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
I 
The Center's original effort was to develop data 
regarding both homeowner insurance availability and lending 
j 
1 
I 
1 
I 
institution data. Only the first aspect was successful because of 
the unavailability of information concerning lending data on the 
basis of race. 
It is important to preface the analysis by 
emphasizing the protections embraced by the Fair Housing Act. Any 
form of race discrimination relating to any aspect of housing is 
outlawed. Starting with this premise, the next step was to review 
the existing data provided by ·the Center and make a judgment as to 
- 24 -
whether or not, first, the data pro-vided any evidence of disparity 
in homeowner insurance relating to race and, second, whether the 
information provides sufficient evidence to state a claim. 
It is further important to acknowledge that the 
data cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Consideration was given to 
other information regarding issues of race discrimination in the 
Omaha area, particularly information which would provide a basis 
for concluding that housing bias was prevalent. In this regard, 
other data was utilized (see Section III). 
Mention is further warranted that Title VIII at the 
present __ time __ }1_as been_inteq:>reted to cover _insurance practices. 
These interpretations are opinions written by a limited number of 
federal district courts throughout the country. Neither any 
federal appeals courts nor the United States Supreme Court has 
addressed the issue. However, Title VIII, while being silent on 
the issue of this type of coverage, is to be broadly construed. 
Hence, reliance is made on the broad construction which is to be 
afforded Title VIII and upon a limited number of federal decisions 
which have addressed the issue of homeowner insurance and the Fair 
Housing Act. Finally, reliance has been made upon the limited 
number of lending cases in which Title VIII has been analysed. It 
is noteworthy that the present session of Congress has before it 
several amendments to the Fair Housing Act w·hich would expressly 
include lending and insurance practices. Therefore, this study 
may not only assist in a determination of where insurance 
practices as they exist violate fair housing law, but may also 
- 25 -
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~ 
1 
I 
I 
provide a basis to encourage the Congress to take the appropriate 
steps absent the ability to measure properly wl:).ether the law has 
been violated. 
, 
~ 
IV. CONSIDERATIONS OF FUTURE METHODS 
Audit procedures must be more specifically utilized 
in the· examination of homeowner insurance practices. While 
telephonic inquiry may be valuable in terms of statistical 
analysis, there must be clearer objective manifestation, for 
example, that the inquirer would be known by a company 
representative as being a member of a minority class. While, 
agai·n, it would be compelling to analyze the statistics of 
responses based on the agent's knowledge of neighborhoods, this 
is, as the present data exists, an evidentiary variable. From a 
legal sufficiency vantage, the question >vould be: what information 
is available that would establish that the agent was aware of the 
racial composition of the neighborhood? While it is clear that a 
violation of Title VIII may be established by determining if an 
adverse impact on minorities results, it is further clear that, in 
an evaluation of a likelihood of prevailing under Title VIII, more 
evidence is simply necessary. 
This may be achieved in several ways. First, it 
may be feasible for auditors to set up appointments with insurance 
agents and share with the agents certain controlled 
characteristics (race of inquirer, knowledge of neighborhood, age 
of housing and other characteristics of housing shared with the 
agent, etc.). The test results of that would clearly be more 
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meaningful and determinative. This resolves the problem of a 
strictly statistical approach because of the assumptions which 
have to be inferred relative to race. Those assumptions, of 
course, include knowledge on the part of the insurance agent of 
the racial composition of the neighborhood and may also assume 
knowledge on the part of the agent of the caller's race. These 
are factors which must be controlled in order to validate a Title 
VIII claim. 
While the role of statistics should not be down 
played, prevailing under Title VIII, however, would probably 
require more. 
Another area of investigation worthy of 
consideration would be interviews of ex-insurance agents who might 
explain the "realities" of the provision (or non-provision) of 
homeowner insurance. Obviously, most past and present 
salespersons in the insurance field would be either reluctant to 
discuss the issue or would simply refuse. In Title VIII 
litigation, however, pursuit in this area has proved fruitful and 
important. 
previously 
Title VIII 
The interview of insurance agents, either presently or 
in the business, 
context. For 
serves to provide crucial data in a 
example, agents will share their 
understanding of the underwriting rationale in the provision of 
homeowner insurance. Often, materials 1vhich are provided to 
agents will be shared. Furthermore, even more importantly, the 
oral instructions from supervisory and other management personnel 
to the agents can be crucial. In addition, notwithstanding the 
materials provided by management to sales personnel, if management 
- 27 -
expresses,_ a personal preference based on racial make-up of a 
neighborhood, that information would be more telling than any body 
of statistics. , 
The resources to undertake this type of data 
' 
gathering would not be substantial. It would be essentially 
required for at least orie staff pair to conduct investigations 
insofar as agent contact. The starting point would be a person's 
own present or former insurance agent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The monitoring of homeowner insurance practices is 
significantly more complex than the auditing of conventional real 
estate practices. There are certain similarities between 
insurance audits and real estate audits. First, there are a 
never-ending numbers of agents. Second, the appropriate random 
sampling of either will, at one point or another, probably evoke 
some sentiments of racial preference by an agent. Third, Hhile 
most real estate brokers or insurance managers would disavow 
racial preferences, liability to them often turns on the actions 
I , of the individual agent .. Moreover, the long history of 
apartheid in America provides the logical base from which the 
vestiges of discrimination in housing are maintained. All aspects 
of housing are infected with racist attitudes which ultimately 
lead to unlawful denial of housing benefits, including benefits of 
homeowner insurance. The sorry history of race discrimination in 
" 
the Greater Omaha area has been borne out by real estate audits 
and by liability of the school board for educational segregation 
28 -
found by the United States District Court in Omaha. There can be 
no logical basis to assume that the area of home insurance has not 
been equally affected with a strain of racism which has been found 
to be so prevalent in other aspects of the community. 
insert here 
Notwithstanding, establishing actual Title VIII 
violations concerning availability of homeowner insurance or 
lending practices may be a relatively difficult task. Unlike 
conventional Title VIII violations, usually seen in real estate or 
property management practices, the development of data concerning 
insurance practices becomes significantly more challenging and 
complex. 
The Center's study regarding homeowner insurance 
practices represents a valid start and what will necessitate a 
more intensive scrutiny· of insurance availability in the Omaha 
area. While it is clear that a violation may be established 
either through purposeful conduct or the effect of conduct (see 
Section II), more data is clearly necessary. One technique may be 
the actual meeting between purported homeowner insurance seekers 
and agen~s. Often in conventional Title VIII matters, the 
potential respondent will admit a racial bias. 
be undertaken with relative ease, assuming 
This technique may 
the resources are 
available. Another technique may be through the interview of ex-
insurance personnel who are on occasion candid about such 
practices. This, again, is a time-tested technique in monitoring 
unfair housing practices in real estate and property management. 
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Deciphering the existing data in terms of its 
potential Title VIII ramifications has been an unsettling task in 
that the rudiments of the ultimate question exis~: that is, there 
appears to be some base of information on which the practices ~ 
uncovered may either have a racial predicate or have the effec·t of 
the denial of insurance based on race. With this foundation and 
assuming the resources, further study in employing the techniques 
as set forth above could demonstrate a clearer picture if race is 
at all a factor in the availability of homeowner insurance. No 
doubt exists that a disparity in availability has been 
demonstrated. The issue, however, is whether there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that racial considerations prevail to the 
extent that the law requires. Without begging the question, it is 
certain that additional data development is required. 
It should further be considered that there is a 
likelihood that the Congress will amend Title VIII in 1984 t·o 
expressly include insurance practices. This statutory change, 
however, will not vitiate the requirement of sufficient evidence. 
It will merely codify what has evolved as the existing correct 
interpretation of the law, bearing in mind that the liberal 
judicial decisions concerning insurance and lending practices have 
only been rendered at the federal district court level and no 
higher court in America has ruled inconsistent with those 
judgments. 
There is little question that insurance and lending 
practices are a fundamental diminsion on the issue of housing 
availability and housing opportunity. It is furthermore 
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und~stood that isolating discriminatory insurance practices 
requires a more sophisticated investigation. Even the reported 
cases (Dunn, Laufman, etc.) involved more blatant and obvious kind 
of actions. 
The Center's efforts have been important 
preliminary undertakings to what should serve as the base for 
future study. The technique suggested herein should be 
considered. Once the data is developed, consideration may given 
to the means by which discriminatory insurance practices, if 
found, can be eradicated. 
Since the Nebraska Attorney General does not appear 
to have the breadth of power afforded his federal counterpart, the 
issue of a pattern and practice of discrimination may also require 
state legislative changes in the existing state equal opportunity 
law. Nebraska's deficiency in this regard should require 
appropriate legislative modification anyhow. As housing 
availability becomes increasingly difficult in the mid-1980's, the 
Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission can address this potentially 
serious problem through appropriate legislative action in bringing 
lenders and insurers exRressly under its coverage. 
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Given the history of racial discrimination in the 
Omaha area, documented by studies by the Center, housing 
organizations and findings in the federal court relative to school 
segregation, it would be illogical to assume that race is not a 
factor in insurance or lending prac"tices. The Center's study 
represents the first effort to isolate the seeds of redlining. 
The employment of some of the suggested techniques may be a means 
of securing the necessary relevant data to determining whether 
lenders and insurers have participated with other actors in the 
housing market to deprive housing choice because of race and 
color. 
Disclosure data from insurers and lenders would, of 
course, do much to aid in this investigation of such practices. 
At one time, HUD was proposing anti-redlining regulations in 
reference to lenders and insurers. While the draft of these 
regulations surfaced in late 1980, the effort was abandoned with 
the new Administration and no regulation whatsoever is even being 
considered. The monitoring process is, therefore, extremely 
difficult, relying almost exclusively on such studies as those 
done by the Center. This is simply not enough. It would be 
difficult to determine if Title VIII has been violated solely on 
disclosures made under H~IDA or CRA. The difficulty is exacerbated 
by Constitutional considerations on lending regulation which 
limits state authority 39 in light of federal disclosure law under 
the Supremacy Clause. 
39
uni ted States Constitution, Article IV, Clause 12. Michigan 
Savings and Loan League v. Francis, 683 F. 2d 857 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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• 
The job in uncovering these practices, which may 
have such a devastating effect on a community, is still in the 
early stages. While it cannot be concluded that the evidence 
presented can establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act, it 
can further be concluded that the first efforts warrant continued 
study. 
SUBMITTED this 
Respectfully submitted, 
AVERY 3. FRIEDMAN 
701 Citizens Building 
Cleveland, OH 44114 
(216) 621-9282 
Fair Housing Consultant 
day of February, 1984. 
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